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Abstract. While the relationship between competition and firm innovation has long been of scholarly 
interest, prior research has predominantly considered changes in internal R&D as a strategic response 
to competitors’ actions. In this study, we focus on one of the most important and commonly observed 
contractual mechanisms used to acquire external technologies: technology licensing. Surprisingly, 
licensing has been mostly overlooked by prior studies examining the effect of competition on firms’ 
allocation of R&D. We take into account the unique properties of licensing, and systematically link 
them to the demands arising from the competitive pressure caused by rivals’ launches of new products. 
Further, we discuss how licensing-in decisions ultimately shape a firm’s subsequent innovation in areas 
where they are threatened by competitors, and how such innovation depends on the cumulative R&D 
investments inside the organization into which licensed knowledge is added. We test our theoretical 
model through a longitudinal design that tracks the licensing-in and innovation outcomes of firms in 
the global biopharmaceutical industry. Accounting for the endogenous selection of firms into licensing, 
our findings illustrate that licensing-in is motivated by competitive pressures. We also find that 
licensing-in increases a firm’s capacity to innovate in areas where competitors have exerted pressure, 
particularly in the presence of cumulative R&D investments. In so doing, the paper anchors technology 
licensing as a key organizational action that helps increase our understanding of the important 
relationship between competition and innovation.   
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Introduction  
The relationship between competition and firm innovation has long been of scholarly interest (Aghion 
et al., 2005; Cohen & Levin, 1989; Kamien & Schwartz, 1982). Rivals’ introductions of new 
technologies and products have the potential to render a firm’s existing technological competencies 
obsolete and undermine its competitive position (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Kaul, 2012). Firms have 
been shown to react to such threats by intensifying their own innovation activities in the form of new 
products and technologies (e.g., Derfus et al., 2008; Doraszelski, 2003; McGahan & Silverman, 2006). 
Prior studies have also examined the way firms organize R&D activities when they experience 
increasing competition, such as emphasizing technology specialization and reducing collaborative 
efforts among scientists (e.g., Martin & Mitchell, 1998; Toh & Kim, 2013; Toh & Polidoro, 2013). 
Although these studies have significantly enhanced our understanding of the effect of competition on 
firm innovation, they have been primarily concerned with how competition shapes internal R&D 
activities. As a result, relatively little attention has been paid to how firms can tap into external sources 
of knowledge to complement their existing internal R&D efforts as a reaction to increasing pressure 
from competitors.  
A few notable exceptions exploring the relationship between competition and external 
knowledge sourcing can be found in the context of strategic alliances. In the course of examining the 
relationship between collaboration and competition, these studies emphasize the inherent challenges 
faced by firms that use alliances to respond to competitive pressure. For instance, Sakakibara (2002) 
emphasizes the coordination costs of R&D consortia, and finds that firms only engage in such 
collaborative modes under weak competition. Ang (2008) suggests that alliances are inherently risky 
and costly, discouraging firms from using them at very high levels of competition. Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven (1996) find that a greater number of competitors accelerates alliance formation, but 
emphasize that this relationship only holds in the context of emergent markets. These findings suggest 
that when a firm’s technological position is threatened by rivals, the firm may not prioritize knowledge-
seeking actions that are time-consuming, require costly coordination, and have highly uncertain 
outcomes (Toh & Polidoro, 2013). However, there are alternative forms of knowledge sourcing that 
allow firms to respond to competition while avoiding the aforementioned challenges. Specifically, 
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technology licensing is one of the most commonly observed contractual mechanisms used to acquire 
technologies (Moreira, Markus & Laursen, 2018; Laursen, Moreira, Reichstein & Leone, 2017; 
Contractor, 1990). Yet, despite its importance, licensing-in has not been considered among the actions 
that firms take when reacting to competition.  
In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by examining whether firms increase technology licensing-
in under competitive pressure, and how such licensing decisions ultimately shape a firm’s subsequent 
innovation. Specifically, our focus is on competitive pressure originating from rivals who have 
successfully launched new products in areas where a focal firm actively engages in R&D (Chen et al., 
2010). Firms want to respond to such downstream pressures by upgrading their own capabilities 
upstream, as new products launched by rivals affect their technological position in the industry (Bierly 
& Chakrabarti, 1996; Martin & Mitchell, 1998). We take into account the specific properties of 
licensing—such as the fact that the licensee selects specific components of externally developed 
technological solutions ex ante, and the unilateral manner in which technologies are transferred from 
the licensor—to explain how licensing can be used as a response to competition (Conti, Gambardella, 
& Novelli, 2013). These properties facilitate firms’ efforts to upgrade their R&D capabilities promptly 
and directly, distinguishing licensing from alternative external knowledge-seeking actions such as 
alliances (Moreira, Markus, & Laursen, 2018; Steensma & Corley, 2000). Thus, the characteristics of 
technology licensing are congruent with the strategic demands arising from competition, such that firms 
increase their use of licensing-in as their rivals develop and bring to market more new technologies. 
Beyond the use of licensing as a response to competition, we also examine how licensing-in 
shapes the subsequent direction of firms’ innovation (Doraszelski, 2003; Eggers & Kaul, 2018). 
Licensing affects innovation, as firms incorporate and recombine licensed knowledge into their ongoing 
R&D efforts. Drawing on the characteristics of licensing, we suggest that licensing-in facilitates a 
prompt and focused response to competitors, as firms can integrate existing externally developed 
technologies with their internal R&D. Thus, licensing is an important means through which firms can 
innovate in areas where they are under competitive pressure. We further explore this relationship by 
taking into account firm heterogeneity with respect to accumulated R&D investments (Dierickx & Cool, 
1989; Doraszelski, 2003; Sull, Tedlow, & Rosenbloom, 1997), which represent a firm’s path-dependent 
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stock of knowledge and expertise (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). We argue that firms have incentives to 
protect such investments by channeling the recombination potential added through licensing towards 
increasing innovation in the areas where they have been threatened.  
We test our theoretical model on a sample of 206 firms operating in the global 
biopharmaceutical industry through an instrumental variable approach (2SLS) in which we 
longitudinally track the effect of competition on licensing-in and the subsequent effect of licensing-in 
on firm innovation. The use of a large longitudinal sample makes it possible to capture competition, in 
the form of products launched by rivals, as a trigger for licensing, and to track the innovative output of 
firms following licensing-in decisions. The granularity of data in the biopharmaceutical industry allows 
us to identify the technological areas of product launches, as well as those of innovative outputs, to 
determine how firm competition and innovation are connected. The dataset we use to test our 
predictions combines licensing data from the Deloitte Recap database, product development data from 
Pharmaprojects to capture competitors’ R&D pressures, and patent data collected from the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) as well as the Derwent World Patents Index to capture firms’ 
innovation outcomes. The findings are in line with our expectations that licensing-in is motivated by 
the launch of new products by rivals. We also find that licensing-in increases a firm’s capacity to 
innovate in areas where competitors have exerted pressure, and that this relationship is magnified in the 
presence of accumulated R&D investments by the focal firm. 
The paper makes several contributions to the literature on competition, technology licensing, 
and innovation. First, it extends previous research on how firms deal with competition by expanding 
the perspective to one of the most commonly used approaches for sourcing external knowledge: 
technology licensing (Moreira et al., 2018; Laursen et al., 2017). Specifically, to our knowledge, this is 
the first attempt to connect the properties of technology licensing to the demands firms experience when 
their rivals are exerting pressure through new product launches. In so doing, we explain how technology 
licensing is an important mechanism that firms use to access external knowledge so they can react to 
competitors’ moves and keep their upstream R&D competencies relevant within the industry. Second, 
the paper adds to the competition literature by linking firms’ licensing-in activities to their subsequent 
innovation in areas where they face pressure from rival product launches. This adds to prior studies, 
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which have examined the technological areas in which firms innovate when faced with competition, 
and how their technological scope is shaped by competition in general (Eggers & Kaul, 2018; Toh & 
Kim, 2013). Finally, we discuss the interplay between licensing-in and a firm’s internal R&D 
investment by illustrating that the relationship between licensing and subsequent innovation directed at 
rivals is shaped by the presence of increasing levels of cumulative and irreversible internal R&D 
investments. This adds to our understanding of how deploying licensed knowledge in areas where firms 
are under competitive pressure may ultimately depend on firms’ internal R&D organization, and their 
prior investments in specific technological areas (Kapoor & Klueter, 2015; Laursen et al., 2017). 
Overall, the paper anchors technology licensing as a key organizational action that helps increase our 
understanding of the important relationship between competition and innovation. We expand on the 
paper’s contributions in the discussion section. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
The development of new products and technologies by competing firms has the potential to destabilize 
firms’ industry position, as it can prompt customers to modify their preferences and purchasing patterns 
(Aboulnasr et al., 2008). Such competition not only alters an industry’s competitive landscape, but also 
shapes the creation of future technological opportunities (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Dosi, 1982). If 
firms do not adjust their R&D to these changes, they may be unable to remain competitive and sustain 
their capacity to innovate.  
A firm has several options when reacting to competition. For example, it can restructure and 
expand its internal R&D in order to catch up to rivals by developing new technologies (Aghion et al., 
2005), or it can attempt to collaborate with other firms and draw on external technological expertise 
(Ang, 2008). However, when competitors successfully bring a new technology to the market, firms may 
want to react promptly by adjusting their R&D strategy in order to sustain their capacity to compete on 
innovation in the future (Doraszelski, 2003). Given this pressing need to respond, firms are unlikely to 
react to innovation by competitors by relying primarily on actions that take a long time to set up, demand 
significant coordination effort, and/or have uncertain outcomes (Ang, 2008; Sakakibara, 2002; Toh & 
Polidoro, 2013). However, there are ways for firms to respond to pressures from competitors without 
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running into the aforementioned issues. We focus on technology licensing, one of the most important 
means through which firms can swiftly source external knowledge, and explore how it helps us 
understand the relationship between competition and innovation. 
The Properties of Technology Licensing  
Like other knowledge-seeking actions, licensing enables firms to access knowledge and technologies 
developed outside their organizational boundaries (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Arora et al., 2001). 
However, technology licensing has specific properties that distinguish it from alternative means of 
knowledge sourcing. A license deal consists of a contract that affords a licensee the right to exploit a 
technology in exchange for the payment of upfront fees and/or royalties (Choi, 2002; Sakakibara, 2010). 
Thus, licensing deals are similar to arm’s-length transactions, with one firm selling a technology and 
another buying it (Moreira, et al., 2019; Conti et al., 2013).  
A key feature of licensing lies in the nature of the underlying technological knowledge and the 
way it is transferred. In a research alliance, two or more firms collaboratively combine resources and 
capabilities to develop a new technology. In contrast, in licensing contracts, the licensor agrees to 
unilaterally transfer know-how and intellectual property related to a technology to the licensee 
(Contractor, 1990; Jensen & Thursby, 2001). This characteristic makes licensing a form of external 
knowledge sourcing that requires significantly less coordination, and reduces uncertainty over whether 
and how a firm can incorporate and use an acquired technology (Contractor, 1990; Mowery, Oxley, & 
Silverman, 1996; Steensma & Corley, 2000). Additionally, licensing differs from collaborative forms 
of knowledge sourcing in that firms can decide the type and characteristics of the technology they wish 
to acquire ex ante. In other words, licensing involves the transfer of existing technologies. This means 
that important characteristics of the technology—such as its stage of development (Laursen et al., 2017), 
technological breadth (Gambardella & Giarratana, 2013), or potential downstream applications 
(Fosfuri, 2006)—can be selected by the acquiring firm. As a consequence, firms can predetermine the 
characteristics of their target technology, and, once it is added into the organization, the licensed 
technology can be incorporated into the firm’s ongoing R&D tasks and efforts (Moreira, Markus, & 
Laursen, 2018).  
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Licensing also enables firms to expand their existing knowledge base (Grant, 1996; Klueter, 
Monteiro, & Dunlap, 2017). Extant research emphasizes that “the number of direct combinations” 
available as inputs to R&D increases the more items of knowledge a firm has at its disposal (Ahuja & 
Katila, 2001:200). There are two distinct ways in which licensing expands the range of technological 
knowledge that a firm can internally leverage. It can be used to add knowledge developed by the 
licensor—often, a firm working on the scientific and technological frontier—with which the acquiring 
firm is not familiar (Hagedoorn, 1993). This has been shown by Leone and Reichstein (2012:967), who 
demonstrate that licensing can function by “[…] extending the licensee’s technology search space and 
facilitating the transfer of otherwise undisclosed knowledge.” Thus, licensing can be used to increase 
knowledge variety, and to allow the licensee to deploy, recombine, and use technologies that it did not 
previously understand, or even know of (Galunic & Rodan, 1998; Grindley & Teece, 1997; Katila & 
Ahuja, 2002). Licensing also entails a transfer of legal rights to grant access and allow the use of 
specific technologies. In this case, even if the newly acquired IP rights are associated with technological 
knowledge that is not new to the licensee, having the legal right to use and exploit a technology in R&D 
activities gives a firm the potential to deploy and further build on it (Ziedonis, 2004). It follows that 
adding knowledge through licensing allows firms to increase the potential for scale and scope in 
inventive recombination, and upgrade their R&D capabilities by aligning their internal R&D with a 
changing technological landscape (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Galunic & Rodan, 1998).  
Finally, drawing on licensed technologies allows a licensee to promptly tap into and use ready-
made external R&D solutions (Leone & Reichstein, 2012). This approach saves not only time, but also 
the resources that would otherwise have to be committed to the trial-and-error process of developing 
technological solutions from scratch (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, & West, 2006). By using licensed 
technologies, firms can directly build on the accumulated R&D expertise developed by other firms 
(Anand & Khanna, 2000). Thus, a licensee can focus its R&D on fewer activities and reduce uncertainty 
related to the development of future innovations, which may ultimately shorten innovation cycles 
(Markman et al., 2005). Moreover, licensing allows a prompt reaction as it is characterized by lower 
In press in Organization Science 
8 
setup costs than alternative knowledge-sourcing agreements. Setting up a license requires fewer 
interactions with the counterparty, and typically fewer resources ex ante too (Klueter et al., 2017). 
The connection between the characteristics of technology licensing and the motivations that 
firms have to integrate licensed knowledge with their own R&D activities is echoed by licensee firms. 
For example, in the context of biopharmaceuticals, Bill Lee, PhD, Executive Vice President of Research 
at Gilead, highlights that licensing a novel monoclonal antibody platform from Trianni in 2018 “[…] 
will help enhance our ability to discover human antibodies and to develop new therapies in areas of 
unmet medical need,” and stresses the importance of “integrating Trianni’s technology into our research 
and development program.” Relatedly, Dr. Paul Anderson, Vice President R&D at Boehringer 
Ingelheim, suggests that licensing Galapagos’ SilenceSelect technology in 2003 “[…] will give us a 
cutting edge in the identification and validation of targets that will form the basis of innovative drug 
design. By concentrating on the drugable genes we will be able to take targets very quickly into drug 
screens, thereby expediting our drug discovery process.” These examples illustrate the idea that 
licensing can be used to acquire specific ready-made technologies that can improve internal R&D.  
Competition and Technology Licensing 
Next, we consider these specific properties of licensing and systematically link them to the demands 
emerging from competition. We focus on competition originating from firms in the same industry 
successfully launching new products in areas in which a focal firm actively engages in R&D. Such 
competitive actions are significant for firms because they can objectively undermine their upstream 
R&D initiatives and competitive position (Bierly & Chakrabarti, 1996; Martin & Mitchell, 1998). 
Therefore, these moves from rivals provide an important impetus for firms to react in order to sustain 
their capacity to compete through innovation. Following the idea that “in some circumstances, it is 
precisely downstream competition [e.g., competitors launching new products] that drives the way firms 
utilize upstream resources” (Toh & Polidoro, 2013:1188), we expect there are important reasons that 
downstream competition will motivate firms to direct their efforts towards upgrading their own R&D.  
Firms compete through their technological capabilities, which have been formed over time in a 
path-dependent manner and with expectations as to how they will perform vis-à-vis the firm’s 
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competitors (Levinthal & March, 1993). Rivals launching new products force firms to benchmark their 
own product pipeline against these new alternatives to ensure their ongoing R&D initiatives remain 
relevant in a changing landscape (Luo, 2003; Martin & Mitchell, 1998). At the extreme, new rival 
products render a firm’s existing product portfolio technologically obsolete, increasing the risk of a firm 
falling far behind the industry’s technological leading edge (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). This risk is 
particularly salient when rival products build on technological domains with which the focal firm is 
familiar (Toh & Polidoro, 2013), requiring the firm to adjust and upgrade its own R&D in order to 
sustain its ability to compete through innovation (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). While such upgrading 
of technological capabilities may not immediately neutralize or reverse a specific threat in areas where 
rivals have launched new products, it is still necessary for firms that want to compete when continous 
innovation is a source of competitive advantage (Bierly & Chakrabarti, 1996).  
While competition induces firms to upgrade their R&D, this may be challenging if they rely 
solely on internal means. Helfat (1994) argues that the path-dependent nature of internal R&D makes 
it harder for firms to use it as the only way to adjust to a changing technological landscape. 
Consequently, firms may need to reach beyond their boundaries to add knowledge and solutions that 
differ from those they already possess in-house (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). However, research on 
accessing external knowledge and, in particular, alliances, reveals that such actions can be time-
consuming and often generate unexpected results (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 
2006; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005). Licensing, however, enables firms to address the specific demands 
emerging from competition, as it allows firms to tap into externally developed knowledge and swiftly 
upgrade their R&D capabilities in a directed manner. 
Licensing deals can be contractually designed ad hoc to facilitate a unilateral knowledge 
transfer, avoiding the difficulties that characterize extensive and complex reciprocal interactions with 
an external partner (Jensen & Thursby, 2001; Laursen et al., 2017; Mowery et al., 1996; Steensma & 
Corley, 2000). Thus, the time necessary to establish a licensing agreement tends to be shorter than other 
forms of knowledge sourcing such as alliances. Therefore, firms can access already-existing 
technologies, which is important when they are trying to prevent their R&D capabilities from becoming 
obsolete (Leone & Reichstein, 2012). Indeed, prior research has emphasized that licensing offers a way 
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to promptly access existing external knowledge and technologies (Contractor, 1990; Kotabe, Sahay, & 
Aulakh, 1996), which is particularly relevant when reacting to rivals’ moves.  
Moreover, licensing allows firms to respond to competition directly by adding specific 
technological knowledge to enhance their ongoing R&D efforts. Competition indicates the types of 
technology that allowed rivals to exert competitive pressure on a firm’s R&D activities in the first place. 
Thus, competitors’ actions reduce uncertainty over which technologies do and don’t work, and how 
their own ongoing initiatives fit within their external environment (McGahan & Silverman, 2006). 
When competitors reveal specific technological solutions, licensing enables a focused strategic reaction, 
as it gives the licensee the opportunity to define ex ante the relevant pockets of knowledge that will be 
acquired (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Teece, 1988). Hence, licensing allows firms to adopt a problem-
oriented response by acquiring specific technologies that are ready to deploy into specific R&D efforts. 
This can be particularly useful when firms are upgrading existing R&D initiatives while taking into 
account the changing technological landscape to which they are trying to adjust (Kotabe et al., 1996; 
Zahra et al., 2005). Taking these arguments together, we suggest:  
Hypothesis 1: Competitors’ product launches in areas in which a firm actively invests in R&D 
increase the firm’s rate of technology licensing-in. 
 
Consequences of Technology Licensing: Recombination Potential and Innovation 
Thus far, we have argued that upgrading R&D capabilities through licensing-in allows firms to react to 
competition. Now, we focus on the outcome of such activities by examining the innovation that follows 
on from technology licensing-in. In general, firms may direct the recombination potential added through 
licensing towards areas in which they are affected by competition, or they can redirect and redeploy 
innovative efforts towards alternative or less contested technological paths (Kaul, 2012; Toh & Kim, 
2013).   
Why would firms want to innovate in areas where they have been threatened by rivals launching 
new products? The launch of new products by rivals induces changes in the way firms compete. When 
a firm’s competitors successfully bring new technological solutions to market, the firm’s existing 
technologies are likely to become relatively less attractive to customers. In such situations, reacting to 
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competitors’ moves by increasing innovation is an important way for a firm to technologically catch up 
to its rivals and ensure that its portfolio of technologies remains competitive and up to date (Teece, 
2007; Zahra et al., 2005). If firms do not channel their own innovation towards areas where rivals have 
successfully innovated, they may become technologically irrelevant and lose the capacity to generate 
future downstream rents from their innovations. By increasing innovation in areas of competition, firms 
can also broaden their claim of intellectual property (IP) over technologies that are commercially 
applicable in the space where their existing R&D initiatives are threatened. Doing so safeguards the 
usefulness of a firm’s existing technological capabilities, as well as its ability to appropriate future value 
in the downstream market from its ongoing innovation initiatives (Utterback, 1994).   
We argue that technology licensing is an important means through which firms can innovate in 
technological areas threatened by competitors. Our arguments build on the idea that innovation is the 
outcome of a recombination process in which firms synthesize both internal and external knowledge 
(Zahra et al., 2005). Furthermore, we consider that the extent to which firms apply and deploy external 
knowledge is determined by the nature of that knowledge, and the mechanism through which it was 
sourced (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Zander & Kogut, 1995). We suggest that the specific properties of 
licensing make it more likely that firms will channel the recombination potential added through 
licensing towards areas in which their rivals have launched new products. 
Licensees select specific knowledge ex ante and contractually agree how it can be deployed 
within their internal R&D (Contractor, 1990). Thus, they are unlikely to explore a large set of broader 
opportunities for recombination (Eisenhardt & Santos, 2002), but will instead focus on visible and 
available targets, such as those revealed by competitors’ product launches. This suggests that the 
direction and scope of licensed knowledge recombination are shaped by existing needs and goals within 
a firm’s R&D, and that the launch of new products by rivals will serve as an important internal signpost 
(Zander & Kogut, 1995). Extant research emphasizes that, due to the complexity associated with the 
development of exploratory and highly novel technologies, firms are more likely to pursue such types 
of combinations through an iterative, repeated, and reciprocal exchange with outside partners 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Galunic & Rodan, 1998). However, this is not the case in licensing, 
which generally reduces the trial and error involved in creating innovations since the recombination 
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process starts from existing, predefined technological solutions (Leone & Reichstein, 2012). Therefore, 
licensing allows firms to both deepen and focus their innovation efforts towards the areas in which 
rivals have launched new products—and such focus is particularly relevant when competition is intense 
(Toh & Polidoro, 2013).  
The recombination potential added by licensing can also allow a firm to react more quickly to 
competitors than internal R&D would allow. A general concern for firms in competitive environments 
is that rivals can build on lead-time advantages that can deter other firms from attempting an entry into 
their technology space, or make such attempts too costly (Toh & Polidoro, 2013). In this sense, a focal 
firm may want to react in a timely way to competition in areas in which it is actively engaged in R&D, 
in order to prevent rivals from taking an unassailable lead in terms of their R&D and technological 
portfolio. This is possible through licensing, which builds on already-developed solutions and, for the 
most part, reduces mistakes and inefficiencies incurred in the process of creating a new technology 
(Chesbrough et al., 2006; Markman et al., 2005). As a result, licensing “augments the recipient firm’s 
product development process by reducing invention time” (Leone & Reichstein, 2012:996), which 
allows the firm to innovate in areas in which competitors have launched new products. It follows that, 
by relying on the recombination potential afforded by licensing-in, firms can accelerate the creation of 
inventions in areas where they need to strengthen their strategic position upstream. 
Overall, our arguments suggest both an important relationship between licensing-in and 
innovation, due to an increased potential for knowledge recombination, and that such potential is likely 
to be channeled towards knowledge areas in which firms face competition. We suggest: 
Hypothesis 2: Technology licensing-in will be positively related to a firm’s subsequent innovation in 
technological areas where competitors have launched new products. 
 
The Role of Cumulative Internal R&D Investments  
We now turn to the internal context into which the licensed knowledge is added. This is relevant, as 
knowledge recombination unfolds within the firm’s existing R&D apparatus (Bierly, Damanpour, & 
Santoro, 2009; Kapoor & Klueter, 2015). We take into account that firms are heterogeneous in the 
degree to which they have accumulated R&D investments in different technological areas (Helfat, 
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1997). These investments represent the time, capital, and skills expended to build up the resources and 
capabilities that position the firm with respect to its competitors (Sull et al., 1997). Such R&D 
investments lead firms to accrue a stock of path-dependent technological knowledge and expertise 
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Also, it is difficult to redeploy these resources 
and capabilities to alternative uses (Ghemawat, 1991; Sakhartov & Folta, 2014). Building on this 
observation, we argue that, when faced with rival launches on their “turf,” firms take into account not 
only potential market revenues, but also the losses associated with relinquishing accumulated R&D 
(Cockburn & Henderson, 1994; Doraszelski, 2003). In particular, such investments shape a firm’s 
incentives towards exploiting the knowledge recombination potential added through licensing in areas 
where rivals have launched new products.  
In general, firms may deploy innovation efforts towards areas of strong competition, or opt to 
focus on less-contested paths (Kaul, 2012). Firms have strong incentives to innovate towards their rivals 
if they have accumulated significant R&D investments in threatened technological areas (Ghemawat, 
1991). Prior research shows that firms that lag far behind their rivals have little incentive to innovate to 
catch up, while firms with substantial R&D investments affected by rivals will compete aggressively 
through innovation (Aghion et al., 2018). Thus, firms’ cumulative R&D investments will pressure them 
to protect the usefulness of valuable accumulated resources and expertise. To do so, firms are more 
likely to deploy knowledge from licensing to generate innovations in the areas where they have more 
at stake. 
Significant accumulated R&D also facilitates a more general response to competitors using 
licensed knowledge. Innovation is a cumulative process, which means that firms’ R&D investments 
feed back into subsequent R&D activities (Helfat, 1997). Having relevant internal R&D accumulated 
in specific technological areas allows a firm to rely on its own capabilities to support and complement 
recombination after licensing-in (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006; Kotabe et al., 1996). This coincides 
with the idea that R&D responses towards rivals are stronger if a firm has a sufficiently large knowledge 
stock to facilitate innovation through a larger set of potential combinations between internal and 
external items of knowledge (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). Based on these ideas, we expect that channeling 
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recombination potential from licensing towards areas where rivals have launched new products will be 
intensified in the presence of cumulative internal investments in R&D in those areas. We hypothesize:   
Hypothesis 3: The higher a firm’s accumulated R&D investments in the technological areas where 
competitors have launched new products, the stronger the relationship between licensing-in and 
subsequent firm innovation in these areas. 
 
METHODS 
Context: The Biopharmaceutical Industry  
We provide an empirical test of our hypotheses in the biopharmaceutical industry. There are several 
reasons why this industry provides an appealing context to empirically examine firms’ use of 
technology licensing as a response to competition, and its subsequent effect on innovation. First, the 
biopharmaceutical industry is characterized by high research intensity and by the strategic importance 
of R&D investments (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994). Extant work emphasizes that the industry is 
primarily knowledge- and technology-driven, as firms continuously expand the scientific and 
technological frontier (Bierly & Chakrabarti, 1996; Klueter et al., 2017; Roberts, 1999). Starting from 
the mid-1980s and moving through the following decades, the industry has experienced rapid 
technological change grounded in biotechnology in the form of new research tools such as 
immunoassay, gene sequencing, and high throughput screening, as well as new therapies such as 
monoclonal antibodies, stem cells, and oligonucleotides (Kaplan, Murray, & Henderson, 2003; Kapoor 
& Klueter, 2015). Owing to this continuous technological change, firms in the industry often need to 
engage in knowledge sourcing alternatives such as licensing in order to access relevant knowledge and 
adjust to a shifting technological landscape.  
Second, the biopharmaceutical industry is highly competitive, as firms continuously progress 
new therapeutic treatments towards regulatory approval in order to receive permission to commercialize 
new drugs and obtain exclusive market access (Cockburn & Henderson, 1994; Doraszelski, 2003). The 
process of commercializing a new molecular entity is time-consuming; it can be over a decade from the 
original discovery to market launch (e.g., DiMasi, Hansen, & Grabowski, 2003; Girotra, Terwiesch, & 
Ulrich, 2007). It is also very costly as firms have to spend, on average, several $100 million in R&D to 
reach market approval (DiMasi et al., 2003). Once approved, new drugs’ earning potential is transient 
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and temporary, since patents or the products’ exclusivity periods have a fixed duration. As a result, 
firms face an increasing need to update and upgrade their R&D capabilities if they are to sustain the 
development of their pipeline and continually bring new drugs to market. Indeed, firms’ R&D 
capabilities are considered the key determinants of future profitability and competitiveness for firms 
within the industry (Bierly & Chakrabarti, 1996; Roberts, 1999; Toh & Polidoro, 2013).    
Third, prior research within the biopharmaceutical industry has established an important 
connection between downstream competition and upstream R&D-related actions and, in particular, how 
product launches by rivals affect firms’ R&D activities. For example, Toh and Polidoro (2013) show 
that product launches by rivals lead firms to reconfigure their R&D activities in specific knowledge 
areas (e.g., hypertension). Polidoro and Theke (2011) find that rivals’ drug approvals can have direct 
implications for subsequent scientific publication patterns upstream in top medical journals. In a similar 
vein, qualitative evidence has shown how rival product launches in beta-blockers, calcium channel 
antagonists, and monoclonal antibodies spurred R&D activities in biopharmaceutical firms affected by 
those launches (Marks, 2015; Scriabine, 1999). These characteristics make the industry an appropriate 
setting in which to examine the effect of downstream product launches by competitors on upstream 
activities in R&D such as technology licensing. 
Fourth, licensing is a highly prevalent form of knowledge sourcing in this industry (Nicholls-
Nixon & Woo, 2003; Nishimura & Okada, 2014). Prior studies have pointed out that 
biopharmaceuticals is one of the few industries in which there is a well-established market for 
technology (Moreira et al., 2019). On the supply side, R&D intensity is high, and technology holders 
rely on the presence of a strong IP regime that allows them to make technologies available for licensing. 
On the demand side, firms can systematically rely on a fluid market for technologies to feed and 
complement their internal R&D efforts (Arora et al., 2001). It is commonly observed that firms use 
licensing to gain access to proprietary technologies, such as Abgenix’s Xenomouse or Human Genome 
Sciences’ gene sequencing technology, to complement their internal R&D efforts in a broad range of 
therapies. Even when firms license therapeutic solutions that are already in development (e.g., new 
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chemical or biological entities), they still gain access to novel knowledge such as the mechanisms of 
actions (i.e., the pharmacological effect of a drug on the human body).  
Finally, the biopharmaceutical industry innovation process follows highly regulated and well-
documented steps. Firms typically seek to protect their research discoveries by filing patents shortly 
before testing possible treatments—first on animals in preclinical trials, and then on humans in clinical 
trials (Girotra et al., 2007). The industry also offers high data granularity with respect to the knowledge 
that underpins R&D activities. In particular, we can observe R&D activities through the lens of broad 
therapeutic areas, such as cardiovascular disease and conditions of the central nervous system, in which 
firms compete (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; Nerkar & Roberts, 2004). Extant work has characterized 
therapeutic and disease areas as “specialized” technical knowledge (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998), and has 
shown that firms within the industry aggregate such specialized knowledge over time in a path-
dependent manner (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). This allows us to identify 
and connect competitors’ product launches (downstream) and innovation activities (upstream) on the 
therapeutic-area level to test our hypotheses. 
 
Data and Sample 
We compiled a novel database combining multiple data sources: Recap Deal Builder, Pharmaprojects, 
Compustat North America, the Derwent World Patents Index, and the NBER patent project. We 
constructed our sample of firms based on the following criteria. First, we ensured that selected firms 
actually deployed technology licensing-in as a mechanism to acquire external knowledge. We used 
Recap Deal Builder to examine the licensing deals listed in 1989–2004, a period of rapid technological 
development in the biopharmaceutical industry due to the proliferation of biotechnology tools and novel 
therapies (Kapoor & Klueter, 2015). Recap is acknowledged as one of the most accurate and 
comprehensive sources of information regarding partnerships and technology exchange involving 
biopharmaceutical firms (Schilling, 2009). It allows us to access detailed information regarding the 
licensing deals, and also to unambiguously identify the licensor and licensee for a given deal. We only 
included firms that had reported at least one licensing deal as a licensee during the period of empirical 
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analysis. This sampling criterion led us to remove 34 firms—mostly smaller firms without downstream 
development activities. 
The second step was to obtain consistent information on financials and licensing decisions for 
our sample firms. In particular, we connected the licensees identified in Recap with the Compustat 
North America file. We focused on listed firms, as they have more stringent financial disclosure 
requirements than their privately held counterparts, alleviating concerns over unreported deals.  
Next, we ensured that the firms in our sample had an R&D (i.e. drug-development) pipeline 
that subjected them to pressure from competitors’ downstream product launches. We extracted R&D 
pipeline information from Pharmaprojects, which has been used in prior biopharmaceutical studies to 
capture drug-development activities (Hess & Rothaermel, 2011; Kapoor & Klueter, 2015). Each drug 
recorded in Pharmaprojects is associated with a primary therapeutic area, such as “Cancer,” 
“Neurology,” or “Cardiovascular.” We coded over 13,000 products in development associated with our 
sample firms to construct the drug-development pipeline of each focal firm. We considered a firm to be 
actively competing in an area if they had drug-development projects or drugs launched in the previous 
five years. Pharmaprojects also documents the launch of new drug products in the industry as key 
events, which allowed us to capture the downstream product market launches from other firms 
(competitors) in therapeutic areas in which a firm was active. 
We captured firm innovation activity by relying on patent information extracted from the 
NBER patent database. This dataset is compiled based on information from the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO). We then deployed the classification system of the Derwent World 
Patents Index to connect each USPTO patent to a therapeutic area. Derwent offers a proprietary patent 
classification system that is applied by professional analysts to facilitate the identification of patents 
based on the function or application domain to which the invention corresponds (Eggers, 2012). Using 
this classification system, we could link patent outputs to therapeutic areas where rivals launched new 
products (Nerkar & Roberts, 2004). This was crucial for identifying a firm’s specific technological and 
technical domains within the industry, as well as connecting upstream (innovation through patents) and 
downstream (new product launches by rivals) activities. 
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Finally, to account for the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) that are widespread in this industry, 
we dynamically tracked changes in the ownership structure of the companies in our sample using the 
M&A information provided by Recap. This allowed us to build a detailed history of each firm and 
ensured that our measures accurately captured a firm’s activities in a given year.  
The sample resulting from matching these datasets was structured as a panel with firm-year 
observations serving as the unit of analysis. In the final sample we observed 206 firms, with each one 
appearing 9.6 times on average, with a minimum of four and a maximum of 17 observations. Our dataset 
included 1,974 firm-year observations covering the period 1989–2004 inclusive. We defined 1989 as 
the starting year based on the availability of consistent licensing and trials information from 
Pharmaprojects, and 2004 as the final year based on the patent data compiled by the NBER project.  
Measures 
Dependent Variables  
Technology Licensing-in. To capture firms’ strategic use of licensing-in as a reaction to downstream 
product market competition, we calculated the total number of licensing-in deals that firm i had engaged 
in in year t. Technology licensing-in is a count variable that takes value 0 if a focal firm did no licensing-
in in a given year, and the corresponding number of deals otherwise. Recap includes several types of 
deals that are distinct from technology licensing-in; to ensure that this measure was aligned with our 
theoretical constructs, we only counted licensing deals, and not any other form of inter-firm agreement 
reported in Recap. Given our focus on licensing as a way for firms to complement internal R&D, and 
not the mere commercial exploitation of technologies, we excluded deals covering technologies that 
were ready to commercialize downstream1.  
 Innovation towards competition. We are interested in examining innovation related to a 
firm’s upstream R&D activities. We captured innovation in areas where rivals had launched new 
products through a firm’s patenting output at the USPTO. In contrast to FDA clinical trials, patents are 
filed shortly after the research and discovery of a new technology (Rydzewski, 2008). Patents are 
considered an important step before firms invest in the lengthy and costly clinical testing necessary to 
                                                          
1 This type of licensing represents less than 5% of the whole population of deals reported in Recap.  
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obtain approvals for new drugs (Tidwell & Liotta, 2012). Thus, capturing patents allowed us to measure 
R&D activities in the years before specific products/drugs were tested in trials or launched on the market 
(DiMasi et al., 2003; Girotra et al., 2007). As an illustration, the patents relating to Lipitor, a statin drug 
aimed at preventing cardiovascular diseases that was launched on the market in 2001, were filed as 
early as 1986. Thus, patent applications allow us to capture upstream development activities (and not 
downstream drug approvals) as an outcome of licensing activities. Finally, patents are strongly 
correlated with future new product introductions and the ability to remain competitive in the 
pharmaceutical industry (Bierly & Chakrabarti, 1996; Trajtenberg, 1987).  
The focus on a single patent office in the US avoids noise produced by differences in evaluation 
procedures across locations. Additionally, given that the US represents the world’s largest market for 
high-tech products, global firms have strong incentives to apply for patents at the USPTO as early as 
possible (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994). We used the patent application date because it is closely 
related to the timing of knowledge creation.  
In order to capture innovations in areas where rivals launched products, we connected each 
patent in our sample to a therapeutic disease area (e.g. oncology, neurology) in which pharmaceutical 
firms compete (Nerkar & Roberts, 2004). We used the Derwent World Patents Index classification 
system to connect the descriptions of therapeutic areas of product launches in Pharmaprojects to 
Derwent codes. The Derwent classification system has a dedicated category “Pharmaceutical 
Activities,” under code B14, that covers the therapeutic areas associated with patents. In many cases, 
Derwent codes correspond to the therapeutic area in Pharmaprojects. For example, the manual code 
B14-H (“Anticancer drugs”) corresponds to the category of “Anticancer” in Pharmaprojects. When such 
straightforward linkages were not possible, we categorized based on subcategories and their underlying 
therapeutic-area keywords as found in Pharmaprojects. All keywords and categories were further 
examined by two expert medical practitioners with over 15 years’ experience. Out of 80 original 
assignments, the experts suggested three changes to more accurately reflect the match between therapies 
in Pharmaprojects and therapeutic codes in Derwent (See online appendix Table A1).  
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Using this classification, a patent generated by the firms in our sample from the NBER patent 
file could be linked to therapy codes2. Then, we measured firm innovation using the count of successful 
patent applications from firm i in year t that were associated with therapeutic areas in which rivals 
exerted pressure on the firm through product launches. Finally, in order to normalize the distribution of 
our dependent variable, we used the logarithm of Innovation towards competition +1 as our measure.  
Competitors’ product launches. We relied on the Pharmaprojects database to capture the downstream 
product market moves from other firms (competitors) in the pharmaceutical industry. We measured the 
extent of competitive pressure by the number of global new drugs launched by competitors in a given 
year in the therapeutic areas in which a sample firm was active. We focused on the key therapeutic areas 
in which biopharmaceutical firms competed on an ongoing basis, such as oncology or cardiovascular 
diseases. Product launches in these areas have the potential to undermine the competitive position of a 
focal firm by affecting its existing revenue streams (Bierly & Chakrabarti, 1996; Cockburn & 
Henderson, 1994). On average, fewer than 140 products are launched globally in the pharmaceutical 
industry in a given year and these launches are extensively covered by the media.  
Furthermore, the approval of new drugs is the outcome of substantial investments in R&D 
activities, with important repercussions for the drug-development pipelines of all firms in the industry 
that have downstream and upstream activities in the same therapeutic area (Ang, 2008). The measure 
Competitors’ Product Launches counts the overall number of drug launches reported in the therapeutic 
areas in which each sample firm was considered active in a given year. A higher number of launched 
drugs suggests stronger competitive pressures on the focal firm3.  
Cumulative R&D Investments. To capture cumulative R&D investments in areas where firms were 
under competitive pressure, we focused on capturing substantial R&D investments that firms had 
accumulated over time. The use of a general measure of R&D expenditure did not provide enough 
specific information for us to distinguish between the R&D accumulated across different therapeutic 
                                                          
2 It is important to note that some patents could be assigned to more than one therapy code. In such cases, we 
counted a patent once if it fell into at least one of the categories in which rivals had launched new products. 
3 We excluded drugs launched by the focal firm in a given year when constructing the variable. As a robustness 
test, we built a measure using the same methodology with newly initiated Phase 3 trials by competitors as a 
proxy for competitive pressures. This measure was highly correlated with the one capturing drug launches, and 
yielded results that were qualitatively similar to those reported here. 
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areas. However, we were able to capture this information by looking at the late-stage clinical trials that 
a firm held in its portfolio. Phase 3 clinical trials reflect path-dependent accumulated investments in 
R&D, as drug-development projects progress step by step through early-stage discovery, preclinical 
tests on animals, and early-stage clinical trials (Girotra et al., 2007). Phase 3 investments entail 
validating the efficacy of a drug in large-scale clinical testing, often through trials involving thousands 
of patients, which is why such Phase 3 trials outweigh the other activities of the drug development 
process in terms of cost (DiMasi et al., 2003). The drug development process can take 10 years or more, 
consuming significant resources, and carries substantial residual uncertainty even in Phase 3, as only 
about 50–80% of such trials ultimately succeed (DiMasi et al., 2003; Stopke & Burns, 2015). Thus, in 
the biopharmaceutical industry, Phase 3 projects represent important accumulated R&D investments 
for firms. The variable Cumulative R&D Investment counts the number of ongoing and successfully 
completed Phase 3 trials of drugs that had not yet been approved for launch as reported by 
Pharmaprojects in the therapeutic areas in which rivals had launched new products.  
Control Variables  
Strategic Alliances. Firms engage in strategic external collaborations to develop knowledge and 
technological capabilities, and to acquire new resources (Mowery et al., 1996). To control for a firm’s 
strategic use of external collaboration, we used the yearly count of R&D co-development and 
collaboration agreements using information from Recap.  
M&A Activities. Firms can use mergers and acquisitions to become more innovative, and also to pre-
empt technology competition. We constructed the variable M&A Activities by tracking the number of 
acquisitions firms had made during a given year.  
Patenting Experience. We controlled for technological experience using the number of years that 
elapsed between the first time the firm applied for a patent and year t.  
Firm R&D Intensity. A firm’s expenditure on R&D activities is one of the main determinants of its 
capacity to absorb external knowledge and generate future innovations (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In 
order to control for firm differences in terms of absorptive capacity, we measured R&D intensity by 
dividing a firm’s R&D expenses by its sales at year t. 
In press in Organization Science 
22 
Downstream Commercial Capabilities. We took into account that firms with more investments in the 
commercialization of drugs and products may react differently to increasing product market 
competition. Accordingly, we controlled for the logarithm of the total amount that firm i invested in 
advertising media and promotional expenses at year t.  
Technological Diversity. A more diverse knowledge base may affect a firm’s ability to recombine 
knowledge and innovate (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). We controlled for technological diversity using 1- 
the Herfindahl index applied to the technological classes of the patents that firm i produced in the seven 
years prior to year t.  
Organizational Myopia. We followed Agrawal, Cockburn, and Rosell (2010) in operationalizing 
myopia based on a seven-year moving-window ratio between the number of citations firm i made to its 
own patents, and the total number of citations that it made overall.  
Evaluation Capacity. Firms differ significantly in their capacity to evaluate external knowledge. On 
the basis of Arora and Gambardella (1994), we calculated Evaluation Capacity using the average 
number of scientific references in the patents accumulated in the seven years preceding year t.  
Technological Complexity. We controlled for firms’ ability to handle technological complexity by 
computing the average number of claims on patents applied for by firm i during the seven years 
preceding year t. Experience in dealing with complex bodies of knowledge makes it easier for firms to 
integrate the acquired technology into their own knowledge bases (Leone & Reichstein, 2012).  
Firm Size. Larger firms may have a stronger propensity to license and innovate. To control for firm 
size, we used the natural log of reported sales for firm i in year t. 
Litigation. To control for licensing-in decisions triggered by patent lawsuits, we used a dummy variable 
that took value 1 if a firm had been sued at least once for infringing another firm’s patents within the 
five years prior to year t, and 0 otherwise.  
Competitors’ initiations of preclinical trials. Firms may respond not only to competitors launching 
new products, but also to competitors’ earlier R&D activities. We controlled for preclinical trial 
initiations made by competitors in the areas where a focal firm was active in R&D. We captured 
initiations through Pharmaprojects by the number of projects by competitors in a given year in the 
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therapeutic areas where a sample firm was active. Two researchers coded the initiation of trials of 
approximately 20,000 projects within the industry to identify the initiation of preclinical trials4. 
Overall Industry Commercial Competition. We controlled for commercial competition in order to 
avoid confounding effects between competitors specifically threatening areas that are relevant for a firm 
and the overall level of downstream competition in the industry. The variable Industry Commercial 
Competition was based on 1- the Herfindahl index computed using firm sales based on four-digit SIC.  
Industry Sales Growth. We controlled for the extent to which specific therapeutic areas may present 
different levels of opportunities (e.g. due to an aging population). We calculated the average sales 
growth in the industry in a therapeutic area using data from Evaluate pharma, and then averaged this 
variable among the therapies in which firms actively invested in R&D. Sales growth is defined as sales 
in a given year over the sales in the prior year. 
Empirical Strategy 
We modeled empirically how competition shapes licensing-in and the subsequent effect of licensing-in 
on firm innovation towards rivals. To test the latter relationship, our technique had to take into account 
that neither of the variables—licensing-in and firm innovation—is independent from the other. Prior 
studies have highlighted that knowledge-sourcing strategy is not exogenous to firm innovation (Singh 
& Agrawal, 2011). It is possible that firms with higher innovation performance may also be more likely 
to rely on external knowledge-sourcing approaches such as licensing-in. Furthermore, despite our 
extensive control variables, there may still be unobservable factors affecting licensing-in decisions and 
also driving changes in the level of innovation in areas where competitors have exerted pressure. To 
deal with these potential issues, we employed an instrumental variable approach (2SLS) in which we 
first estimated the effect of competition on licensing-in decisions, and then the effect of licensing-in on 
firm innovation. The first stage of our 2SLS model was used to test Hypothesis 1, after which we used 
the second stage to test Hypotheses 2 and 3. 
                                                          
4 Given the abundance of early-stage projects in the pharmaceutical industry, we limited our investigation to 
publicly listed firms, while for the variable Competitors’ Product Launches we captured all global product 
launches in the industry. 
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The implementation of an instrumental variable technique requires one or more instruments 
that significantly predicts the dependent variable in the first stage, but does not correlate with the error 
term in the second equation (Wooldridge, 2003). As the use of multiple instruments can provide more 
accurate estimations in 2SLS models, we employed two distinct instruments to strengthen the 
robustness of our empirical analysis (Angrist & Krueger, 1991).  
 For the first instrument, we exploited a setup based on the enactment of statutes within the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) that took place in 46 US states between 1975 and 2008. The 
enactment of UTSA by different states over time was driven neither by state-level economic conditions 
and industry competition, nor by individual firm-level characteristics such as innovation (Png, 2017). 
This alleviates concerns that the decision to enact the UTSA could be driven by the variables used to 
test our hypotheses. The implementation of the UTSA has also been used by several studies examining 
issues related to secrecy and innovation (e.g., Castellaneta, Conti, & Kacperczyk, 2017; Png, 2017). 
Through the UTSA, a trade secret became more narrowly defined as information that includes 
formulas, patterns, compilations, programs, devices, methods, techniques, or process. Furthermore, the 
UTSA also defined civil and criminal procedures for claims and damages, and the corresponding 
remedies in case of misappropriation (Simon, 1998). Once the secrecy regulations had been 
implemented in a state, the likelihood of getting involved in a court action due to misappropriation 
increased, as did the costs of such litigation (Simon, 1998). Although there may be cross-state variations 
in the extent to which UTSA statutes were implemented, and their interpretation, the enactment of this 
legislation generally resulted in stricter and clearer trade-secret protection (Png, 2017). Such regulations 
are particularly relevant to the biopharmaceutical industry, where the reliance on external knowledge 
may spark costly disputes (Nealey, Daignault, & Cai, 2015).  
We expect that this law will increase the number of licensing deals in the pharmaceutical 
industry by affecting incentives on both the supply and demand sides of the market for technology. 
Because the law toughened up both the definition of misappropriation and the remediation for violations 
related to trade secrets, we expect potential licensors to be more willing to offer technologies that are 
not protected by formal IP mechanisms. In this sense, technologies that are protected by secrecy, as 
opposed to formal IP, can entail significantly more learning opportunities for the licensee, as such 
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technologies are strategically kept undisclosed to the general public. Thus, post-UTSA enactment, the 
market for technologies is likely to exhibit a larger proportion of technologies with greater learning 
potential, which will be more keenly sought by potential licensees. Furthermore, if the legal remedy for 
misappropriation is clearly defined, licensors are less likely to be concerned about the potential misuse 
of their technologies, and therefore engage more actively in helping licensees understand and exploit 
the technology being transferred (Choi, 2002). This is important, as—in contrast to highly codified 
knowledge—the transfer of trade secrets requires more commitment from the technology supplier in 
order to ensure that the licensed technology is actually understood by the licensee. Licensors’ 
commitment to supporting licensees’ understanding and use of the licensed technology means that more 
knowledge flows between the two firms post-licensing (Oxley & Wada, 2009). Technology licensing 
allows both codified and uncodified technological knowledge to be contracted from the licensor to the 
licensee. In fact, the complexity of technologies in the biopharmaceutical industry results in licensing 
deals that include the transfer of knowledge that firms protect through secrecy (Arora, 1995).  
We followed prior studies (see Castellaneta et al., 2017) to identify the state and year of 
enactment of statutes conforming to UTSA. To implement this setup, we tracked longitudinal changes 
in the status of UTSA enactment for firm i, which is located in state j, at year t. We used a dummy 
variable that took the value 0 when a state had not yet enacted the UTSA (or never enacted it during the 
sample period), and 1 once it had done so (or had already done so before the sample period began). 
With this setting, we captured both cross- and within-state variation in UTSA legal status. Therefore, 
we had a treatment group comprising firms in post-UTSA states, and a control group of firms in pre-
UTSA states. Accordingly, our instrument was measured using a dummy variable capturing 
longitudinal and cross-sectional differences in UTSA status.  
As a second instrument, we used a variable that influences technology holders’ licensing 
decisions based on longitudinal changes in the supply structure of the market for technology in the 
biopharmaceutical industry. Prior research emphasizes that technology holders’ willingness to license 
out their technologies reduces friction in the market for technology, making it more fluid (Arora & 
Fosfuri, 2003; Arora & Gambardella, 2010; Gans & Stern, 2003). As discussed by Teece (1986), one 
of the main factors driving technology holders’ willingness to license-out their technologies is their own 
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(lack of) commercial capability to market their final products to customers. The stronger firms’ 
commercial capabilities, the more they can profit from their own R&D investments, which induces 
them to take their technologies all the way from development to commercialization in-house instead of 
resorting to licensing as an alternative means of commercialization (Gans & Stern, 2003). As the 
opportunity cost of licensing out a technology as opposed to exploiting it in-house increases, technology 
holders are not only less likely to offer technologies for sale, but are also more likely to drive a harder 
bargain with potential licensees. This suggests that the stronger technology holders’ commercial 
capabilities are in an industry, the fewer licensing deals we expect to observe in the market for 
technology.  
We operationalized commercial capabilities in the biopharmaceutical industry as an instrument 
capturing the amounts spent on Selling, General, and Administrative Expenses (SG&A) in a given year 
(Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). SG&A expenses are associated with company promotion and the 
commercialization and delivery of products and services. To do so, we identified all the public firms 
operating in the SIC codes 2834 (“Pharmaceutical Preparations”) and 2836 (“Biological Products”), 
which represent the most important technology suppliers in the industry. We also restricted the sample 
used to compute this instrument to firms that had successfully applied for at least one patent within the 
five years prior to the focal year t, to capture only those firms with licensable technologies. Based on 
this sample we extracted the total amount that each firm spent on SG&A in a given year from 
COMPUSTAT. We then computed the technology-holding firms’ average spend on SG&A in a given 
year, excluding the focal firm (our possible licensee). We expect that when there is high average SG&A 
spend for technology holders in the industry, these firms will have higher licensing-out opportunity 
costs, and thus our focal firm will license less, since the cost of acquiring technologies should increase. 
While we expect that this second instrument will negatively affect the licensing-in decision for firms, 
we do not expect it to affect how focal firms deploy licensed technologies to innovate in areas where 
competitors have launched new products.  
Finally, to increase the robustness of our estimations, our empirical analysis also included 
within-firm fixed effects to account for any additional unobservable characteristics that are stable over 
time. We also used year fixed effects to capture time trends in licensing and innovation that are common 
In press in Organization Science 
27 
to all the firms in our sample. Finally, we use different year-lag structures between our dependent and 
independent variables in order to capture the nature of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and simple pairwise correlations between the dependent and 
independent variables used in the regression analyses. We start by reporting the two dependent 
variables, and then move into the main explanatory and control variables. Results of the pairwise 
correlation raised no significant concerns regarding multicollinearity. Particularly, with the exception 
of one pairwise correlation, the explanatory variables Competitors’ Product Launches and Cumulative 
R&D Investments, which are used to test the hypothesized effects, do not present any strong 
correlations, either with each other or with the control variables. The control variable Competitors’ 
Initiation of Preclinical Trials shows a high correlation with Competitors’ Product Launches in the 
magnitude of 0.82. This correlation is in line with our expectations, given that both variables capture 
different stages of competitors’ drug development. To test whether this was a concern, we estimated 
our models with and without this control variable, and our main results remained unchanged. 
Additionally, the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) associated with the variables in our empirical 
model is very low (Mean VIF=2.94).  
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 reports the result of the first stage of the 2SLS regressions predicting firms’ rate of 
Technology Licensing-in. We reported three different year-lags (t+1, t+2, and t+3) between the 
dependent and independent variables. Before interpreting the coefficient concerning our hypothesized 
effects, we examined the validity of the instruments we used to predict changes in Technology 
Licensing-in that are exogenous to Innovation Towards Competition. The coefficient for the first 
instrument, UTSA Enactment, reported in Model I indicates that the implementation of the UTSA 
statutes at the state level is positively and statistically significantly (p<0.001) associated with our 
dependent variable. The coefficient for the second instrument, Technology Holders’ Commercial 
Capabilities, is negatively and also highly significantly (p<0.001) associated with our dependent 
variable. The direction and significance level of both instruments are in line with our expectations. We 
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use the models reported in Table 2 to test Hypothesis 1, concerning the effect of Competitors’ Product 
Launches on firms’ Technology Licensing-in. The estimated coefficient for the variable Competitors’ 
Product Launches is positive and statistically significant across the different models, which suggests 
that competitors exerting pressure downstream through product market launches makes firms react by 
engaging in technology licensing-in. This lends support to Hypothesis 1, which suggests that 
competitors’ product launches in areas in which a firm actively invests in R&D increase the firm’s rate 
of technology licensing-in. Removing the variable Competitors’ Initiation of Preclinical Trials, the 
main effect for Competitors’ Product Launches remained statistically significant at the 5% level.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, we relied on the estimates of the second stage of the 2SLS 
regression. We used Technology Licensing-in, the dependent variable in the first stage, as an 
explanatory variable predicting longitudinal changes in Innovation Towards Competition. As part of 
the 2SLS approach, the second-stage models explicitly account for potential endogeneity issues 
between licensing and innovation. We used Models I, II, and III in Table 3 to test the effect of 
Technology Licensing-in on Innovation Towards Competition. Because the process of recombining 
licensed-in knowledge with a firm’s internal R&D may vary over time, we tested the effect of 
Technology Licensing-in on the dependent variable using three different lag structures: t+1, t+2, and 
t+3. The effect of licensing-in on innovation towards competitors remained statistically significant 
across the three different lags. This finding provides consistent support to Hypothesis 2, which suggests 
that technology licensing-in will be positively related to a firm’s subsequent innovation in technological 
areas where competitors have launched new products.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
To test Hypothesis 3, we split the sample into firms below and above the median value for 
Cumulative R&D Investments using one-year lag t+1 as a reference5. We used a split sample approach 
in order to avoid the complications associated with the selection and variance adjustments in 2SLS 
estimations (Wooldridge, 2009). Model IV, reported in Table 3, refers to the observations in which the 
                                                          
5 Using either the two- or three-year lags generated results consistent with those reported below. 
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values fall below the Cumulative R&D Investments median, while Model V refers to those above the 
median. The comparison of the coefficients for Technology Licensing-in indicates the strength of the 
conditional effect that Cumulative R&D Investments has on the main relationship between licensing 
and Innovation Towards Competition. Using the split sample approach, we find that Technology 
Licensing-in only affected our dependent variable significantly for the observations that were above the 
median value for Cumulative R&D Investments. We observe that in Model IV the coefficient for 
technology licensing is insignificant, while Model V reports a positive and statistically significant 
effect. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 3, which argues that the higher a firm’s accumulated 
R&D investments in the technological areas where competitors have launched new products, the 
stronger the relationship between licensing-in and subsequent firm innovation in these areas. 
In order to visualize the magnitude of the effect of Technology Licensing-in on Innovation 
Towards Competition, Figure 1 shows the marginal effect for different levels of this explanatory 
variable. The effect of licensing on innovation stays positive and significant for the different values 
reported in the graph. In terms of size effects, an increase of one standard deviation in Technology 
Licensing-in from its mean is associated with a corresponding change of 46% in our dependent variable. 
Figure 2 helps visualize the effect of Technology Licensing-in on Innovation Towards Competition 
when taking into account different levels of Cumulative R&D Investments. The figure shows the 
changes in the predicted levels of the dependent variable looking at simultaneous changes in licensing 
and accumulated R&D. There is a peak (i.e., the red area around the upper right side) in the rate of 
Innovation Towards Competition precisely when Technology Licensing-in and Cumulative R&D 
Investments are simultaneously at their highest levels. Conversely, when both variables are at their 
lowest levels simultaneously, Innovation Towards Competition reaches its lowest level (i.e., the blue 
area). In terms of size effect, an increase in Cumulative R&D Investments of one standard deviation 
from its mean leads to an increase of 11% in the effect of Technology Licensing-in on Innovation 
Towards Competition.  
Finally, we comment on some interesting patterns revealed by our control variables. In Model 
I Table 2, the control Competitors’ Initiation of Preclinical Trials is significant and negative predicting 
technology licensing-in. However, some of this effect is driven by the correlation of the variable with 
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other covariates. Indeed, Competitors’ Initiation of Preclinical Trials without including Competitors’ 
Product Launches in the model shows no statistically significant effect on licensing. In principle, 
reacting earlier to rivals’ actions may have advantages, as firms may keep their R&D capabilities 
relevant, and at the technological frontier. However, this industry is characterized by a large number 
(possibly thousands) of new projects, which still entail substantial levels of uncertainty (DiMasi et al., 
2003; Girotra et al., 2007), and this could make it difficult for firms to identify which project initiations 
to react to. Indeed, we know that one of the key issues firms face in environments of technological 
change is the issue of limited attention, which may be salient when there are too many different 
preclinical initiations by rivals (Eggers & Kaul, 2018). The patterns observed for Competitors’ 
Initiation of Preclinical Trials suggest that, in contrast to Competitors’ Product Launches, early-stage 
R&D activities by competitors do not predict licensing-in.   
Additional Analyses 
The central idea in this paper is that firms use technology licensing-in to acquire external knowledge 
that they can subsequently incorporate into internal R&D activities. However, with our empirical setup, 
we do not observe directly the knowledge transfer and learning shaping firm innovation. Thus, we 
complemented our initial results with additional analyses to demonstrate the underlying mechanism 
through which licensing affects the licensee’s R&D activities more directly.  
 We distinguish three important areas that help explicate the relationship between licensing and 
innovation: first, whether licensee firms leverage specific in-licensed technologies; second, whether 
licensee firms leverage the licensors’ technologies in general; and third, changes in the patterns of the 
licensee R&D output following licensing. The results for these additional tests are reported below.  
Use of licensed technologies. In order to determine whether firms do increase their patenting 
activities using specific licensed technology, we examined a subset of licensing deals for which we 
could capture the underlying technology of the deal and track the subsequent citation patterns for the 
focal firm (the licensee). We examined licensing deals available in Recap for which we could access 
and download the actual licensing contract between licensee and licensor, and for which we could find 
a specific seven-digit patent number in the contract that was registered at the USPTO and represented 
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the licensed technology. Next, we looked at the backward citations in the patents that the licensee firms 
had produced before and after the licensing deal. As a dependent variable, we used the cumulative 
number of citations that a licensee firm made to a specific licensed technology during the four years 
preceding a licensing deal, and the four years following. The main explanatory variable is a dummy for 
the post-licensing period that takes value 0 pre-licensing and value 1 post-licensing. The results are 
reported in Model I in Table 4. The coefficient of the post-licensing indicator suggests a positive 
relationship of citations to a specific technology post licensing, supporting the idea that firms learn 
about specific technologies through licensing.  
One potential issue with this approach is that licensing could occur simultaneously with the 
decision to focus the firm’s R&D on specific technological areas. Thus, we used a more stringent 
econometric specification in which each licensed patent was matched to a comparable control group. 
We matched licensed against non-licensed patents on the same technological classes, application year, 
and the value of the patent (measured based on forward citations). Based on the two groups, licensed 
and non-licensed, we performed a difference-in-differences analysis in which we compared the citation 
patterns of licensee firms to the two groups of patents, pre and post a licensing deal. The dummy 
variable post-licensing takes a value of 0 for the pre-licensing period and 1 for the post-licensing period, 
for both groups’ control and licensed patents. The dummy treated takes value 1 if a patent belongs to 
the licensed group and 0 if it belongs to the control group. The main result comes from the interaction 
between these two dummies and is reported in Model II in Table 4. The interaction post-licensing x 
treated captures the longitudinal changes in the citations received by a licensed technology in the post-
deal period while accounting for the rate of citations to a patent that has similar characteristics but has 
not been licensed. This interaction effect is positive and statistically significant. We take this test as 
important additional evidence that firms are making productive use of the licensed technologies by 
incorporating them into their own R&D. 
Finally, we went through the broad list of licensing deals in our sample and searched for their 
history using multiple data sources including LexisNexis, Pharmaprojects, Adis R&D Insight, and 
Evaluate Pharma. We found several instances where we had sufficient information to conclude that 
licensed knowledge had been incorporated in a firm’s R&D activities. For example, licensing deals 
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including Xenomouse technology (licensee Pfizer), human leucocyte antigen blocking technology 
(licensee Merck & Co.), or gene expression technology (licensee Immunex) led to the creation of a new 
product in preclinical trials, and firms typically patent such products prior to testing them on humans 
(Girotra et al., 2007). In the identified cases, about 2.3 years separated the licensing agreement and the 
initiation of preclinical trials. Given that patenting typically takes place even earlier, this also gave us 
confidence that our window of 1–3 years is adequate to test for firm patenting following licensing. 
Licensor–licensee knowledge transfer. Next, we consider that the knowledge transferred 
between licensee and licensor can also extend beyond the licensed technology. Therefore, we examine 
citation patterns of licensee patents, which use the patents produced by the licensor as an input. We 
expect that such citations capture the knowledge flow from licensor to licensee following a licensing 
deal. Following our theoretical arguments, we expect that, post-licensing, firms will also tend to 
significantly increase their reliance on the licensor’s technologies to feed their own R&D efforts. 
Conversely, if licenses are signed purely for the transfer of IP rights, we would not expect the licensee 
to increase their use of the licensor’s wider technological portfolio; instead, they would confine 
themselves to the single licensed technology.   
Specifically, we examine the number of citations made by the licensee to the licensor’s patents 
as evidence for learning between the firm providing the knowledge and the licensee. Similar to the 
technology-level analysis, we capture the number of citations that the licensee makes to the licensor 
pre- and post-licensing deal using four-year windows. The analysis is on the level of the licensee-
licensor dyad. The key explanatory variable takes a value of 0 for the pre-deal period and 1 for the post-
deal period. Results of a negative binomial count model are reported in Model III in Table 4. The 
positive and highly significant coefficient for Post-Licensing suggests a strong increase in the licensee’s 
citations of the licensor’s patents post-licensing, which offers further evidence to support a knowledge 
transfer and learning mechanism.  
We wanted to ensure that these results were not driven by the fact that larger firms are also 
more likely to have more patents, and therefore also cite more patents from any other firm, including 
the licensor. Thus, we calculated the ratio between total citations to licensor patents and the licensee’s 
total citations. This alternative dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 1, and we used a Tobit 
In press in Organization Science 
33 
model with the same setup as in the previous test. Model IV in Table 4 once again shows strong evidence 
that licensees cite licensors more frequently post-licensing—even when normalizing the citation counts.  
 Post-licensing innovation. In the third set of analyses, we examined the post-licensing 
patenting patterns of the licensee. While we show that firms create more inventions in areas where rivals 
have launched new products, we also wanted to test whether a licensee changes in terms of its 
technological profile after licensing.  
First, we calculated firms’ Scope of Recombination by looking at how many different 
technology classes they cited in a given year, to capture the extent to which they recombined knowledge 
from a wider range of technological fields. In detail, we capture a licensee’s yearly count of different 
technological classes that they cite in patents (Gruber, Harhoff, & Hoisl, 2013). The key explanatory 
variable is the number of licensing deals in a given year by a focal firm. As shown in Model V in Table 
4, this variable has a direct (positive) effect on the scope of recombination. Focusing on patents filed in 
the areas where rivals have launched new products also validates these results.  
Next, we wanted to more directly capture the exploration of new technologies by the licensee 
as a result of licensing activity. The dependent variable is Use of New Technologies at the firm level, 
captured through the ratio between the number of new citations and the total number of citations that 
firms make each year. Following prior work, we consider a citation to be “new” if it has not been used 
for 7 years prior to the focal year (Phelps, 2010). Model VI in Table 4 shows the Tobit model results 
using Use of New Technologies as the dependent variable. As the coefficient of yearly licensing deals 
shows, we find strong evidence that firms are able to explore more new technologies following 
licensing. Once more, this strengthens our overall premise: that licensing facilitates learning and new 
recombinations. These results suggest that licensing-in, in our context, is not merely an exchange of IP 
rights, but shapes firms’ recombination of knowledge within their R&D activities.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Alternative Explanations and Robustness Checks  
We performed several additional analyses to test alternative explanations as well as the robustness of 
our results (available from the authors upon request). First, to test whether technology licensing also 
In press in Organization Science 
34 
affects firms’ general innovation in the same way as it affects innovation towards competition, we 
replicated our main models using the number of patents in areas not affected by competitors as a 
dependent variable. We found no statistically significant effect for licensing-in on this alternative 
dependent variable. This suggests that licensing as a reaction to competition has an effect on innovation 
in areas where a firm has been threatened, but not necessarily on its overall innovation output. 
Interestingly, though, we did find that the variable Strategic Alliances had a positive and significant 
effect (p<0.05) on general innovation. These findings reveal that licensing is more likely to be used as 
a form of knowledge sourcing when firms have clear R&D targets—as distinct from alliances, which 
tend to be deployed in a more general way.  
Second, studies (e.g., Laursen & Salter, 2006) have indicated that firms that over-rely on (over-
utilize) knowledge outsourcing are likely to harm their innovation outcomes. If this idea held for 
technology licensing-in, we would expect a non-linear relationship between the number of licensing-in 
deals and firm innovation. We investigated whether such a relationship was present in our sample by 
adding the squared-term of the number of licensing-in deals. The coefficient for the non-linear term was 
positive and statistically insignificant. This finding provides no indication that too much licensing 
reduces firms’ capacity to innovate in the focal areas in which competitors have launched products. 
Third, we also examined whether product launches by competitors have different effects on 
firms’ decision not to license in a given year and the amount of licensing deals that firms engage. We 
use a zero-inflated negative binomial model with the first equation estimating the likelihood that a firm 
will engage in licensing and the second stage the total number of licensing deals in a given year. The 
results for the variable Competitors’ Product Launches not statistically significant, on the first-stage 
but positive and significant effect on the second-stage of the zero-inflated model.  
Fourth, we investigated not only whether firms do more licensing-in when competition is more 
intense, but also whether the characteristics of the deals then change. We split the licensing deals into 
deals realized under high and under low competitive pressure (based on the mean value of Competitors’ 
Product Launches). We then used a set of t-tests to investigate whether three technology-related 
attributes were statistically different across the two subsamples: the Stage of Development of the 
Licensed-In Technologies, whether the Licensor is a University, and the Amount of Royalty Payment 
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agreed in the licensing remuneration scope6. We did not find any statistically meaningful differences 
for these three attributes. With respect to the licensing deals, we also explored an additional check 
related to the use of exclusivity clauses in the contractual scope of the licensing deals involved. 
Exclusive deals can affect the incentive that the licensee firm has to commit resources in the upstream 
development of the licensed technology. We estimated our models having removed from our sample 
those deals in which the licensee had exclusive rights to exploit the licensed technology, and the results 
remained very similar to those obtained with the full sample of licensing deals. In this regard we found 
no evidence that exclusivity clauses will significantly shape the extent to which the firms in our sample 
increase innovation towards competition. We also ran a robustness test in which we used an alternative 
measure for cumulative R&D investments by including all products launched in a given year. The 
results using this alternative operationalization are very similar to the ones reported in our main results. 
Finally, we examine licensors’ and licensees’ industry affiliation, as the predominance of 
licensing deals between firms within the same industry could suggest stronger knowledge overlap pre-
licensing, and possibly that licensing is done for IP motives such as pre-empting litigations due to patent 
infringement, rather than to acquire new knowledge with the intention of learning and strengthening the 
firm’s internal R&D. In our sample, 70% of the licensees come from SIC 2834 (“Pharmaceutical 
Preparations”). Conversely, licensors are more evenly spread, with the main industries including 2834 
(36%), 2835 (“In Vitro and In Vivo Diagnostic Substances,” 10%), and 2836 (“Biological Products, 
Except Diagnostic Substances,” 36%). Based on the industry distribution, licensee firms are 75% more 
likely to license from a firm located in a different SIC code.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
How are competition and innovation connected? The question has attracted longstanding interest 
(Aghion et al., 2005; Cohen & Levin, 1989; Kamien & Schwartz, 1982). In this paper, we approach it 
by anchoring technology licensing as a key organizational action that helps increase our understanding 
of the important relationship between competition and innovation. 
                                                          
6 To perform this test, we changed the level of analysis from firm-year observations to deal level, as the same 
firm can engage in more than one licensing deal in the same year.  
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We focus on the characteristics that make licensing an important response when firms are under 
competitive pressure from rivals’ new products (downstream) and try to upgrade their own 
technological capabilities (upstream). These characteristics include the ex-ante definition of the 
knowledge to be acquired and the unilateral manner in which it is transferred. Further, we investigate 
the outcomes of technology licensing-in by examining how licensing relates to firm innovation. We 
emphasize that licensing is particularly relevant for the creation of innovation in technological areas in 
which firms are under pressure from rivals. At the same time, this relationship is contingent on a firm’s 
cumulative R&D investments that are threatened by competitors. Thus, the way licensing connects 
competition and innovation may be contingent on what is “at stake” for a firm’s internal R&D. We find 
support for our predictions using a sample of firms within the biopharmaceutical industry. 
Our study makes important contributions to the research on competition, licensing, and 
innovation (Aghion et al., 2005; Arora & Gambardella, 2010; Toh & Kim, 2013). First, we demonstrate 
the role of licensing as a way for firms to tap into external sources of knowledge to complement their 
existing internal R&D efforts. In so doing, we clarify the distinct role of licensing versus other 
knowledge-seeking actions, such as alliances, as a response to firms’ upstream capabilities being 
threatened by competitors. Prior research examining the relationship between competition and 
collaboration has suggested that the inherent coordination costs and risks of strategic alliances 
discourage firms from using them when competition is very intense (Ang, 2008; Sakakibara, 2002). We 
show that licensing is an important mechanism that firms can use to promptly access external knowledge 
when under pressure from rivals. 
Second, we add to the innovation literature by linking licensing to subsequent innovation in 
areas in which firms are under pressure from rivals. This expands on the general idea that downstream 
competitive pressure may have important implications for firms’ upstream activities (Toh & Polidoro, 
2013). Specifically, our study joins a recent research stream (e.g., Eggers & Kaul, 2018; Martin & 
Mitchell, 1998; Toh & Kim, 2013) that goes beyond examining how competition affects innovation in 
general by accounting for the direction of a firm’s innovative efforts when reacting to competitors. We 
add to this literature by examining innovation directed towards areas in which rivals have put firms 
under pressure, and by testing how licensing-in allows firms to innovate in such areas.  
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On a more general level, we throw more light on the question of how firms can derive 
innovation benefits from licensing, or whether licensing is simply a “handoff” that has no effect on a 
firm’s capacity to innovate (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Koza & Lewin, 1998). By showing that 
licensing-in actually triggers changes in the way firms innovate, we provide more evidence that 
licensing goes beyond the transfer of IP rights, and also opens up recombination opportunities for the 
licensee. This adds to the understanding of firms’ demand for licensing (Arora & Gambardella, 2010), 
and to the analysis of the repercussions of licensing on firms’ capacity to innovate (Johnson, 2002). 
Finally, we illustrate the interplay between licensing-in and a firm’s internal R&D by showing 
that the relationship between licensing and subsequent innovation directed at rivals is shaped by the 
presence of cumulative R&D in specific technological areas. This adds to our understanding of how 
integrating, recombining, and deploying external knowledge in general may depend on the internal 
R&D organization to which such knowledge is added (Bierly et al., 2009; Kapoor & Klueter, 2015). In 
particular, we explicate that licensed knowledge is deployed towards innovations in areas in which 
rivals are exerting competitive pressure in the presence of internal cumulative R&D investments in 
those same areas. Thus, cumulative investments shape a firm’s incentives towards exploiting the 
knowledge recombination potential added through licensing in areas where rivals have launched new 
products. With less cumulative investment in those areas, firms may have little to gain from channeling 
their recombination potential from licensing towards these areas of competitive pressure, and may opt 
for alternative paths. This adds to the broader conversation in the literature about the conditions under 
which firms will try to innovate in areas where they are under competitive pressure, or when they will 
avoid confronting their rivals directly (Clarkson & Toh, 2010; Kaul, 2012).  
This study also has limitations, which provide ample opportunities for future research.  Starting 
at the relationship of rival product launches and licensing, we considered rival product launches as 
possible threats to firms, as any successful launch of a new drug in a therapeutic area in which a focal 
firm is actively investing in R&D gives the competitor an edge. However, it is possible that such threats 
also present opportunities for firms to examine relevant technological domains. Future studies could 
carefully examine the types of rivals’ product launches, in order to unpack whether increasing patenting 
activity in the related areas could be driven by either opportunities or threats.  
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With respect to the relationship between licensing and innovation, we emphasize that licensing-
in may help firms innovate and stay competitive vis-à-vis their rivals. However, we have not examined 
whether the licensing activity ultimately leads to future product launches, which will allow firms to 
compete in commercial markets. Given the lengthy R&D cycles in the pharmaceutical industry, 
establishing a clear linkage between licensed knowledge and launched drugs may be challenging. Even 
so, future studies on the licensing level may reveal how licensed knowledge is, ultimately, transformed 
into marketable products. Relatedly, we have not taken into account that licensing might impose costs 
over the longer term. Previous research has suggested that firms need to maintain a satisfactory level 
of internal R&D in order to sustain innovation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Therefore, heavy reliance 
on mechanisms such as licensing agreements may upset the appropriate balance between internal and 
external knowledge flows (Mulotte, Dussauge, & Mitchell, 2013) or lead to the emergence of path 
dependences and core-rigidities. Given that firms can use technology licensing to channel their R&D, 
this may lead to R&D myopia and a lack of capacity to shift to alternative paths. This raises the question 
of whether firms that boost innovation in the short term through licensing may face issues over the long 
term, as their capacity to innovate based on their own R&D may be impaired. Thus, future studies 
should track more systematically how licensing shapes long-term internal innovation.  
Another limitation is that we focus on just one contingency related to cumulative R&D 
investments—albeit an important one. However, it is well known that external knowledge sourcing, and 
the integration and recombination of licensed knowledge, are contingent on many factors, including a 
firm’s absorptive capacity (Moreira et al., 2018), attention from scientists and managers (Klueter et al., 
2017), the structure of collaboration networks among scientists (Moreira et al., 2018), or the diversity 
of the knowledge base of the firm (Laursen et al., 2010). These factors have been shown to be relevant 
for the general innovation outcomes of firms. Future research could build on our study and explore 
additional firm-level contingencies that can moderate or directly affect the relationship between 
technology licensing-in and innovation within the context of high competition.   
With respect to our empirical setting, we used biopharmaceuticals as the empirical context to 
test our hypotheses. This industry made an adequate setting, since it is characterized by R&D 
competition and licensing is common. However, it also raises concerns regarding the generalizability 
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of our findings. Future research should aim at extending this study into different empirical settings in 
which the acquisition of external knowledge plays a key role, such as the semiconductor and electronics 
industry. Relatedly, an important extension of our study is to move beyond the year 2004, which is 
where our sample period ended. For this study we took a 15-year period for which we collected all 
relevant data, including licensing, patenting, and rival product launches. We know that licensing has 
played an important role for firms in the last decade, and, despite some consolidation, competition 
remains fierce, with new players emerging (e.g. Gilead or Regeneron) (Giniatullina et al., 2013; OECD, 
2013). However, the rise of information technology may shape how firms observe their competitors and 
the landscape of licensing opportunities, which is why testing our model post-2004 would be interesting. 
Concerning our analysis related to the additional tests, we believe that the robustness of the 
econometric specifications has substantially reduced empirical concerns. However, in our empirical 
setup we do not connect directly how specific licensed technologies are deployed by the licensee firm 
to create innovations. This limitation leaves space for future studies aiming at further understanding 
knowledge transfer and recombination in the context of technology licensing. Particularly, we 
encourage future research examining the existence of a causal link between licensing and innovation, 
using alternative identification strategies and different levels of analysis such as the level of the licensed 
technology or dyadic licensor-licensee level. We also note that we only take into account endogeneity 
related to licensing-in and innovation, and therefore do not fully account for potential issues in the first 
stage of our 2SLS models. Unobserved factors could simultaneously drive competitors’ new-product 
launches and firms’ licensing-in decisions. This issue is partially mitigated by the way we operationalize 
competitive pressure from competitors. In the biopharmaceutical industry, rival product launches 
require approval from an external authority (e.g. the FDA in the US), which is a very complex and 
costly process that mostly ends in failure. This suggests that neither competitors nor a focal firm in our 
sample will have full control over the product launches and the areas in which new drugs are approved. 
In conclusion, we believe that licensing-in plays a central role in helping us understand the 
relationship between competition and innovation. This creates a promising avenue for future studies 
aimed at connecting drivers of licensing, such as competition, and outcomes, such as innovation. The 
present paper constitutes a first step towards exploring this research agenda. 
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 Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients (N =1,974; Groups=206)         
 Variable  Mean S.D. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
[1] Technology Licensing-in      2.47      4.53 1.00          
[2] Innovation towards competition      1.08      1.34 0.58 1.00         
[3] Competitors product launches     47.91     34.94 0.61 0.60 1.00        
[4] Cumulative R&D Investments      1.44      2.12 0.64 0.58 0.59 1.00       
[5] Strategic Alliances      0.21      0.62 0.54 0.41 0.40 0.37 1.00      
[6] M&A Activities      0.18      0.50 0.38 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.20 1.00     
[7] Patenting Experience     10.16      8.07 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.14 0.19 1.00    
[8] Firm R&D Intensity     25.16     30.40 0.26 0.36 0.27 0.21 0.18 0.14 0.10 1.00   
[9] Downstream Assets      0.75      1.85 0.29 0.25 0.35 0.40 0.11 0.14 0.44 0.07 1.00  
[10] Technological Diversity      0.50      0.35 0.25 0.29 0.24 0.23 0.16 0.12 0.35 0.06 0.27 1.00 
[11] Organizational Myopia      0.13      0.15 0.04 0.21 0.03 0.07 0.02 -0.03 0.18 0.01 0.03 0.09 
[12] Evaluation Capacity     27.60     32.10 -0.14 -0.08 -0.12 -0.19 -0.06 -0.10 -0.25 0.06 -0.19 -0.16 
[13] Technological Complexity     18.78      9.26 -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.04 0.04 -0.12 0.04 -0.16 -0.14 
[14] Firm Size      3.94      3.17 0.59 0.53 0.61 0.55 0.32 0.28 0.64 0.23 0.57 0.43 
[15] Litigation      0.24      0.43 0.38 0.42 0.39 0.38 0.21 0.16 0.38 0.26 0.31 0.20 
[16] Competitors Initiation of Preclinical Trials    283.23    206.93 0.54 0.59 0.82 0.58 0.32 0.20 0.34 0.28 0.39 0.25 
[17] Overall Industry Commercial Competition      0.16      0.15 -0.16 -0.22 -0.23 -0.20 -0.10 -0.10 -0.12 -0.09 -0.16 0.03 
[18] Industry Sales Growth      1.20      1.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.00 -0.03 -0.05 
              
 Variable  Mean S.D. [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18]   
[11] Organizational Myopia      0.13      0.15 1.00          
[12] Evaluation Capacity     27.60     32.10 -0.05 1.00         
[13] Technological Complexity     18.78      9.26 -0.04 0.19 1.00        
[14] Firm Size      3.94      3.17 0.04 -0.30 -0.14 1.00       
[15] Litigation      0.24      0.43 0.04 -0.08 -0.07 0.48 1.00      
[16] Competitors Initiation of Preclinical Trials    283.23    206.93 0.06 -0.11 -0.12 0.56 0.41 1.00     
[17] Overall Industry Commercial Competition      0.16      0.15 0.02 0.10 -0.07 -0.15 -0.12 -0.14 1.00    









Table 2. First-stage firm fixed effects regressions predicting Technology Licensing-in 
  it+1  it+2  it+3 
Variables  Model I Model II Model III 
Competitors product launches 0.017*** 0.023*** 0.013** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Cumulative R&D Investments 0.040 0.076 0.026 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.162) 
Strategic Alliances 0.519*** 0.568*** 0.360* 
 (0.102) (0.101) (0.191) 
M&A Activities 0.624*** 0.127 0.670** 
 (0.123) (0.119) (0.213) 
Patenting Experience 6.152*** 5.768*** 5.780*** 
 (0.430) (0.429) (0.700) 
Firm R&D Intensity -0.001 0.008** 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Downstream Assets -0.246*** -0.124** -0.282** 
 (0.063) (0.062) (0.143) 
Technological Diversity -0.142 -0.052 -0.344* 
 (0.185) (0.189) (0.180) 
Organizational Myopia 0.153 0.345 -0.050 
 (0.559) (0.558) (0.581) 
Evaluation Capacity 0.000 0.005 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Technological Complexity 0.005 0.004 0.006 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Firm Size 0.166** 0.055 0.295** 
 (0.076) (0.080) (0.094) 
Litigation 0.141 0.456* 0.125 
 (0.260) (0.261) (0.354) 
Competitors Initiation of Preclinical Trials -0.002** -0.003*** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Overall Industry Commercial Competition 3.204*** 5.208*** 4.143*** 
 (0.721) (0.753) (1.225) 
Industry Sales Growth 0.064 0.053 0.079** 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.040) 
UTSA Enactment 3.036*** 3.908*** 1.937** 
 (0.919) (0.922) (0.830) 
Technology Holders’ Commercial Capabilities  -0.131*** -0.122*** -0.122*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
Constant 63.537*** 55.746*** 53.215*** 
 (4.968) (4.774) (7.313) 
Number of Observations 1,974 1,768 1,562 
Two-tailed tests for all variables; standard errors in parentheses.                 

























Table 3. Second-stage 2SLS firm fixed effects regressions predicting log(Innovation Towards Competition+1) 
 
it+1 it+2 it+3 
Low Cumulative 
R&D Investment  
High Cumulative 
R&D Investment  
Variables  Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
Technology Licensing-in 0.099*** 0.102*** 0.097*** -0.118 0.075** 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.029) (0.243) (0.023) 
Competitors product launches 0.002 0.002* 0.002 0.000 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cumulative R&D Investments 0.076*** 0.070*** 0.053**   
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
Strategic Alliances -0.065 -0.098** -0.136** 0.241 -0.052 
 (0.040) (0.045) (0.051) (0.311) (0.047) 
M&A Activities -0.094** -0.058 -0.077 0.358 -0.149** 
 (0.043) (0.048) (0.054) (0.227) (0.054) 
Patenting Experience 0.036*** 0.037** 0.041** -0.006 0.108*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) 
Firm R&D Intensity 0.001* -0.000 -0.002** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
Downstream Assets -0.109*** -0.103*** -0.094*** -0.020 -0.067** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.061) (0.021) 
Technological Diversity 0.081 0.036 0.041 0.078 0.039 
 (0.054) (0.061) (0.065) (0.068) (0.084) 
Organizational Myopia 0.283* 0.083 -0.089 0.949*** -0.122 
 (0.162) (0.185) (0.206) (0.222) (0.241) 
Evaluation Capacity 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Technological Complexity 0.002 0.005* 0.003 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Firm Size 0.044** 0.060** 0.066** 0.103** 0.019 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.031) (0.035) 
Litigation 0.450*** 0.407*** 0.319*** 0.396** 0.407*** 
 (0.075) (0.082) (0.086) (0.173) (0.096) 
Competitors Initiation of Preclinical Trials 0.000** 0.000** 0.001** 0.001** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Overall Industry Commercial Competition 0.634** 0.286 -0.075 -0.083 0.899** 
 (0.227) (0.255) (0.284) (0.307) (0.377) 
Industry Sales Growth -0.003 -0.020 -0.015 -0.014 0.021 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.025) 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -1.067*** -0.995*** -0.796*** -0.342* -1.849*** 
 (0.162) (0.174) (0.184) (0.190) (0.335) 
Number of Observations 1,974 1,768 1,562 812 1,162 
Two-tailed tests for all variables; standard errors in parentheses.                   
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       






Table 4. Licensing and Knowledge Transfer         






















Use of New 
Technologies  
Treated x Post-Licensing  0.242**     
  (0.114)     
Treated  0.193***     
  (0.050)     
Post-Licensing 0.272** 0.030 0.322*** 0.010***   
 (0.109) (0.030) (0.092) (0.002)   
Technology Licensing-in     0.011** 0.025** 
     (0.004) (0.010) 
Competitors product launches -0.004* -0.002* -0.002 -0.000 0.000* 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Cumulative R&D Investments -0.061** -0.032** 0.077** 0.001** 0.033*** 0.006 
 (0.026) (0.013) (0.024) (0.000) (0.008) (0.020) 
Strategic Alliances 0.038 0.034 0.049 0.001 0.037** 0.024 
 (0.043) (0.026) (0.060) (0.001) (0.017) (0.053) 
M&A Activities 0.293** 0.128** 0.085 0.001 0.005 0.051 
 (0.116) (0.062) (0.096) (0.002) (0.021) (0.065) 
Patenting Experience 0.011 0.006* 0.015 0.000 0.077*** 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.000) (0.004) (0.006) 
Firm R&D Intensity -0.005 -0.002 0.003** 0.000* 0.002*** 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Downstream Assets -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Technological Diversity 0.164 0.094 0.061 -0.013* 0.079** 0.341** 
 (0.178) (0.090) (0.462) (0.008) (0.033) (0.112) 
Organizational Myopia 1.951* 0.960* 2.749*** 0.046*** -0.107 -0.680** 
 (1.045) (0.528) (0.691) (0.012) (0.091) (0.232) 
Evaluation Capacity 0.006 0.003 0.012** 0.000* -0.001* -0.006*** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Technological Complexity 0.046* 0.023* -0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.025) (0.013) (0.011) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) 
Firm Size -0.088 -0.046 0.022 -0.000 -0.448*** -0.372*** 
 (0.061) (0.031) (0.061) (0.001) (0.020) (0.058) 
Litigation 0.156 0.067 -0.004 -0.001 0.092** -0.079 
 (0.211) (0.107) (0.186) (0.003) (0.042) (0.087) 
Competitors Initiation of Preclinical Trials 0.002* 0.001* 0.000 -0.000 0.000* -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Overall Industry Commercial Competition 0.173 0.072 -0.124 0.005 -0.026 0.029 
 (0.999) (0.511) (0.770) (0.013) (0.136) (0.250) 
Industry Sales Growth -0.442 -0.222 0.078 0.002 -0.009 -0.005 
 (0.445) (0.238) (0.077) (0.002) (0.009) (0.031) 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -0.617 -0.403 -4.015*** -0.078*** -0.406*** 0.669** 
 (0.514) (0.263) (0.814) (0.015) (0.090) (0.251) 
Number of Observations 809 1.618  4.863  4.863 1.749 1,749 
Two-tailed tests for all variables; standard errors in parentheses.                   
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
 








Figure 1. Marginal Effect of Technology Licensing-in on 




Figure 2. Linear Prediction for Innovation Towards 
Competition conditional on Technology Licensing-in and 
Cumulative R&D Investments  
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